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ABSTRACT 
 
Hypothetical moral dilemmas, pitting characteristically utilitarian and non-utilitarian outcomes against each 
other, have played a central role in investigations of moral decision-making. Preferences for utilitarian over non-
utilitarian responses have been explained by two contrasting hypotheses; one implicating increased deliberative 
reasoning, and the other implicating diminished harm aversion. In recent field experiments, these hypotheses 
have been investigated using alcohol intoxication to impair both social and cognitive functioning. These studies 
have found increased utilitarian responding, arguably as a result of alcohol impairing affective empathy. The 
present research expands existing investigations by examining the acute effects of alcohol on affective empathy 
and subsequent moral judgments in traditional vignettes and moral actions in virtual reality, as well as 
physiological responses in moral dilemmas. Participants (N = 48) were administered either a placebo or alcohol 
in one of two dosages; low or moderate. Higher dosages of alcohol consumption resulted in inappropriate 
empathic responses to facial displays of emotion, mirroring responses of individuals high in trait psychopathy, 
but empathy for pain was unaffected. While affective empathy was influenced by alcohol consumption in a 
facial responding task, both moral judgments and moral actions were unaffected, suggesting that facets, beyond 
or in addition to deficits in affective empathy, might influence the relationship between alcohol consumption 
and utilitarian endorsements.  
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Introduction 
 
Traditionally, provocative moral dilemmas, pitting characteristically utilitarian versus deontological 
ideologies against each other, have played a central role in the investigation of moral judgment (e.g., Bartels, 
Bauman, Cushman, Pizarro, & McGraw, 2015; Cushman, Young, & Greene, 2010). For example, in the switch 
dilemma, individuals must decide whether to flick a switch, redirecting a trolley car to kill one worker on the 
tracks instead of five (Thomson, 1976). Alternatively, in the footbridge dilemma, individuals must decide 
whether to push a large person in front of the trolley, in order to stop it from killing the five workers on the 
tracks (Foot, 1978). This ‘trolley problem’ has generated interest as individuals tend to give the typically 
consequentialist or utilitarian judgment (they judge that maximising the number of lives saved is morally 
acceptable) in the switch case, but refuse to do so in a characteristically deontological sense (harm is wrong and 
the ends don’t justify the means) in the footbridge case (Thomson, 1976).  
Several theories have attempted to understand these divergent responses given their structural 
similarity in entailing the five-for-one trade-off (Thomson, 1976). Greene’s dual-process model of moral 
judgment (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001) distinguishes between “personal” dilemmas 
like the footbridge and “impersonal” dilemmas such as the switch.  Personal dilemmas are those “involving 
actions that are (a) likely to cause serious bodily harm, (b) to a particular person, where (c) this harm does not 
result from deflecting an existing threat onto a different party” (Greene et al., 2001, p. 2107). These dilemmas 
are thought to trigger an emotional and aversive response; an “alarm bell” associated with emotional systems in 
the brain (Cushman et al., 2010, p. 50) resulting in a deontological or non-utilitarian response (i.e., refusing to 
endorse harmful actions). In the absence of this negative alarm bell in impersonal dilemmas, the utilitarian 
option dominates the response, driven by increased activations in brain areas associated with controlled 
cognitive processes (Greene et al., 2001).  
Greene’s model has received attention across many research domains, with a strong body of research 
supporting the theory that deliberative reasoning results in greater utilitarian moral judgments (e.g., Greene, 
Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene et al., 
2001; Koenigs et al., 2007). However, the proposed link between utilitarian responses and increased reasoning 
has also been challenged (e.g., Kahane, Everett, Earp, Farias, & Savulescu, 2015) with research suggesting that 
increased utilitarian preference may, instead, derive from a decreased aversion to harming others as a result of 
deficits in social processing (Patil, 2015). For example, research suggests that the increased “utilitarianism” 
found in psychopathic populations, results from deficits in affective empathy1 (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; 
Djeriouat & Tremoliere, 2014; Gao & Tang, 2013). In fact, recent investigations of moral actions in virtual 
reality trolley problems have found a positive association between psychopathic traits and utilitarian actions 
(Francis et al., 2016) and the strength of these actions (Francis, Terbeck, et al., 2017). These actions were also 
negatively associated to traits inversely related to psychopathy such as Honesty-Humility (sincerity, fairness, 
greed avoidance, and modesty). Support for this social processing hypothesis can also be found in 
pharmacological studies; Citalopram (a drug that enhances serotonin and subsequent pro-social behaviour) 
enhanced non-utilitarian moral responses (Crockett, Clark, Hauser, & Robbins, 2010), while increased levels of 
testosterone (Carney & Mason, 2010) and increased levels of anger (e.g., Choe & Min, 2011) have been 
associated with increased utilitarian responses. 
One way in which research has sought to investigate the relationship between social and cognitive 
functioning in moral decision-making, is to study populations impaired in affective empathy and higher-order 
cognitive abilities. Previous research has examined individuals with deficits in emotional processing either as a 
result of brain lesions (e.g., Ciaramelli, Muccioli, Ladavas, & di Pellegrino, 2007), neurological disorders (e.g., 
Mendez, Anderson, & Shapira, 2005) or alcohol and drug dependence (Carmona-Perera, Clark, Young, Perez-
Garcia, & Verdejo-Garcia, 2014; Carmona-Perera, Reyes Del Paso, Perez-Garcia, & Verdejo-Garcia, 2013; 
Khemiri, Guterstam, Franck, & Jayaram-Lindstrom, 2012). To date, there have been few investigations of the 
acute effects of alcohol on moral judgments made in response to hypothetical moral dilemmas. In a recent study, 
Duke and Begue (2015) examined acute effects of blood alcohol concentration (BAC) on moral decision-
making in participants recruited at bars in France. Across two studies, they found that BAC levels were 
                                                          
1Given that “empathy” encompasses a variety of related phenomena (Decety & Cowell, 2015), here we 
investigate the affective components of empathy specifically and define affective empathy as “...the generation 
of an appropriate emotional reaction in response to others’ emotions” (Feshbach, 1978; 1987 as adopted by Wai 
& Tiliopoulos, 2012).   
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positively correlated with utilitarian preferences in response to the footbridge dilemma and that this effect was 
not mediated by self-reported feelings of behavioural disinhibition or self-reported positive mood.  
The finding that acute alcohol consumption promotes utilitarian moral judgments in response to 
personal moral dilemmas supports previous research examining moral decision-making in alcohol-dependent 
individuals (Carmona-Perera et al., 2014; Khemiri et al., 2012). These studies have found that prolonged effects 
of alcohol dependence result in greater utilitarian moral judgments as a result of affective processing deficits.2 
Crucially, these findings are in contention with Greene’s dual process model which would argue that alcohol 
intoxication triggers emotional reactivity and impaired higher order functioning, which in turn prompts 
increased non-utilitarian moral judgments (Greene et al., 2001). Duke and Begue (2015) argue that instead, their 
finding implicates a strong role for impaired social cognition in predicting utilitarian preferences. Alcohol 
intoxication results in a “…decreased capacity for empathy” or more specifically, decreased aversion to harming 
others which subsequently promotes the utilitarian option (Duke & Begue, 2015, p. 125). However, affective 
empathy was not explicitly measured in this paradigm. From a broader perspective, the theory that alcohol 
intoxication produces utilitarian responses as a result of impaired affective empathy, is consistent with the 
connection between utilitarianism and certain deficits in social functioning as a result of brain damage (e.g., 
Koenigs et al., 2007) and psychopathic traits (e.g., Patil, 2015). 
Few studies have investigated both cognitive and affective empathy in alcohol-dependent individuals 
specifically (Thoma, Friedmann, & Suchan, 2013). Of the few that have examined this, some argue that 
impairments in premorbid trait empathy compromise social functioning, leading to more social problems, which 
could then predispose individuals to use alcohol as a coping strategy (Thoma et al., 2013). In terms of 
distinctions between affective and cognitive empathy in these individuals, several studies have found that 
affective empathy is principally impaired in alcohol-dependent individuals (Maurage et al., 2011; Marinkovic et 
al., 2009) and addicted patients more broadly (Ferrari, Smeraldi, Bottero, & Politi, 2014). While recent research 
has found that acute alcohol consumption reduces empathic neural activity for pain (Hu, Cui, Fan, Pei, & Wang, 
2017), the specific effects of acute alcohol intake on affective empathy have yet to be investigated. This is 
particularly important following suggestions that deficits in affective empathy mediate the relationship between 
alcohol consumption and utilitarian moral decision-making (Duke & Begue, 2015).  
Addressing Limitations 
The quasi-experimental setup adopted by Duke and Begue (2015) raises questions regarding the 
influence of social atmosphere, potential social awareness, and uncontrolled alcohol dosages on moral decision-
making. The present experiment addressed these limitations through a laboratory-controlled study, examining 
the effects of low and moderate dosages of alcohol consumption on moral judgments and moral actions.. Whilst 
the research by Duke and Begue (2015) may have shed further light on the role of social deficits on utilitarian 
moral judgments, research has yet to investigate similar manipulations within the domain of moral action. This 
is significant given evidence of a disparity between moral judgments given in response to text-based vignettes 
and moral actions simulated in virtual trolley problems (e.g., Francis et al., 2016; Francis, Terbeck, et al., 2017; 
Francis, Gummerum, Ganis, Howard, & Terbeck, 2017; McDonald, Defever, & Navarrete, 2018; Patil, Cogoni, 
Zangrando, Chittaro, & Silani, 2014). With previous research in this area supporting an association between 
moral actions and personality traits associated with diminished harm aversion (e.g., Francis et al., 2016; Francis, 
Terbeck, et al., 2017; Tassy, Deruelle, Mancini, Leistedt, & Wicker, 2013), exploring the effects of a diminished 
capacity to process social cues seems highly relevant in the domain of moral action.  The present experiment 
was also adapted to include behavioural assessments of affective empathy and harm aversion in an attempt to 
shed light on the relationship between these traits and moral decision-making, beyond that of questionnaire 
assessments which can be confounded by social desirability responding. 
Specific Hypotheses 
                                                          
2 The psychopharmacological effects of alcohol consumption are not reviewed in length here as alcohol has 
several mechanisms of action on the central nervous system (Carlson, 2010); alcohol produces a complex effect 
that is mediated by distinct receptor systems that are not evenly amplified with ethanol dosage (Stoleman, 
2010). For example, among other effects, alcohol facilitates GABA transmission, inhibits glutamatergic 
transmission, and increases serotonin transmission (Stoleman, 2010). Each of these prompts and mediates 
various anxiolytic, sedative, stimulant, and reinforcing effects (Carlson, 2010).  
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Moral Responses 
If existing research examining acute effects of alcohol (Duke & Begue, 2015) and alcohol dependence 
(Carmona-Perera et al., 2014) on moral judgments in personal moral dilemmas (such as the footbridge dilemma) 
is supported, increased utilitarian preferences may be observed. If this relationship is influenced by deficits in 
social processing and reduced aversion to harm, performance in behavioural affective empathy tasks should 
decrease following alcohol consumption and this decline should be associated with utilitarian preferences in 
response to well-known moral vignettes (taken from a Greene et al., (2001)). If, on the other hand, existing dual-
process models of moral judgment can be supported, then alcohol consumption might lead to increased 
preference for non-utilitarian moral judgments as a result of increased emotional reactivity and decreased 
cognitive functioning (Greene et al., 2001).  
Predictions regarding simulated moral actions in a virtual reality version of the footbridge dilemma 
(used in Francis et al. (2016)) are less certain. Given previous research demonstrating the link between 
utilitarian moral actions and traits associated with reduced affective empathy and less aversion to harm (e.g., 
Francis et al., 2016; Francis, Terbeck, et al., 2017; Patil, 2015; Tassy, Deruelle, et al., 2013), alcohol 
intoxication may result in greater utilitarian actions if affective empathy is diminished in behavioural measures 
of affective empathy. However, the latter hypothesis supporting Greene’s dual process model may also stand if 
existing models apply to the domain of moral action (e.g., Navarrete, McDonald, Mott, & Asher, 2012). In the 
present investigation, heart rate sampling was completed with the primary aims of assessing whether arousal 
was modality or moral specific (as in Francis et al., 2016) and, in this experiment specifically, to determine 
whether blood alcohol level affected physiological arousal in response to moral scenarios. 
Affective Empathy 
In previous research, self-reported valence (i.e. attraction or aversion) towards facial displays of 
emotion has been used as a measure of affective empathy (Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012). Self-reported valence 
towards happy faces was negatively predicted by psychopathy, with valence towards sad faces showing the 
inverse effect (Ali, Amorim, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2009; Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012). In the present 
investigation, personality traits were assessed in order to investigate their relationship with these behavioural 
measures of affective empathy, subsequently allowing validation of these behavioural approaches (Wai & 
Tiliopoulos, 2012). If behavioural assessments of affective empathy provide a valid measure of trait affective 
empathy, performance in them is expected to inversely relate to primary psychopathy, as shown in previous 
research (Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012). In contrast, performance should positively correlate with existing trait 
assessments of affective empathy including Empathic Concern, a facet of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
(IRI) (Davis, 1978), one of the longest-used measures of empathy.  Both Honesty-Humility, a trait relevant to 
reciprocal altruism (Ashton, Lee, & de Vries, 2014) thought to capture elements of empathic concern (Brick & 
Lewis, 2016), as well as trait assessments of moral identity should be positively associated with these 
behavioural assessments given that affective empathy, Honesty-Humility and moral identity (internalization) are 
thought to be connected facets of moral character (Cohen, Panter, Turan, Morse, & Kim, 2014) given that they 
relate to the consideration of others (Cohen & Panter, 2015). Given their focus on the welfare of others, these 
traits are also inversely associated with primary psychopathy (Glenn, Koleva, Iyer, Graham, & Dito, 2010; Lee 
& Ashton, 2014). As an additional measure, previous research has adopted empathy for pain tasks as a means of 
assessing affective responses to the pain of others (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 
2005). If these provide a valid assessment of empathy for pain, reduced empathy for harm might be observed in 
individuals scoring higher in psychopathy and associated traits based on previous research (Bartels & Pizarro, 
2011; Patil, 2015). 
The second purpose of incorporating these behavioural affective empathy tasks was to provide a 
baseline with which to compare performances in post-intervention empathy tasks following alcohol 
consumption. If acute alcohol intake does affect social processing, by reducing the capacity for affective 
empathy and decreasing harm aversion, then alcohol consumption is expected to reduce performance in these 
behavioural measures of affective empathy. Self-reported valence towards happy and sad faces and self-reported 
empathy towards painful images may be reduced as a result of impaired social processing and emotional 
blunting (Duke & Begue, 2015). For facial displays of emotion specifically, self-reported valences following 
alcohol consumption may mirror the inappropriate responses given by individuals scoring high in psychopathy 
(Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012).  
Method 
Participants 
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The present sample size was based on previous research (Duke & Begue, 2015). Fifty participants 
comprising 33 females and 17 males (Mage = 21.60, SD = 4.65 years, age range: 18 - 42 years, ethnicity: 89.58% 
Caucasian, 6.25% Mixed/multiple ethnic groups, 2.08% Asian British, 2.08% Black African) were recruited 
from the Plymouth University, School of Psychology student participant pool and participated for course credit. 
All participants were students enrolled on a psychology course at the university. All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and the majority of participants were right-handed (84.1%). Two participants were 
excluded from the experiment; one having failed to see clearly in the non-moral virtual task as a result of vision 
problems and one having failed to complete the non-moral virtual task due to lack of understanding. As such, 48 
participants comprising 31 females and 17 males (Mage = 21.44, SD = 4.63 years, age range: 18 - 42 years) 
formed the final sample. All participants met inclusion criteria; they were not alcohol-naïve, not suffering from 
panic or anxiety attacks, not taking prescription medication that would be affected by alcohol consumption, they 
had no personal or family history of alcohol dependence, they did not report significant psychological problems, 
they were not pregnant or expecting to become pregnant, and they had not experienced aversive allergic 
reactions to alcohol consumption in the past. This research received ethical approval from the Plymouth 
University Ethics Committee.  
Experimental Design  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: placebo (N = 16, 10 females and 6 
males (Mage = 22.13, SD = 6.43 years); low alcohol (N = 16, 10 females and 6 males (Mage = 20.06, SD = 2.82 
years); high alcohol (N = 16, 11 females and 5 males (Mage = 22.13, SD = 3.91 years). A mixed-model design 
was adopted to examine whether there were differences between groups of individuals who consumed varying 
dosages of alcohol (placebo; low alcohol; high alcohol) across a set of repeated measures tasks (behavioural 
measures of affective empathy; moral decision-making measures). The main outcome measures were 
behavioural measures of affective empathy scores (self-reported valence to facial displays of emotion; self-
reported intensity of pain pictured in images) before and after alcohol consumption, moral responses (moral 
actions simulated in a virtual moral dilemma; moral judgments in a text-based moral dilemma) and heart rate 
responses in both a virtual reality and text-based moral dilemma (see Figure I).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure I. Diagram showing primary outcome measures in experimental sequence. Alcohol is consumed (at 
varying dosages) after the first set of behavioural measures of affective empathy are completed. Note that each 
participant completes all of the tasks displayed (repeated measures variables).  
 
Secondary measures included personality trait assessments (to examine their relationship to responses 
in the behavioural measures of affective empathy prior to alcohol consumption) and manipulation checks and 
various control measures (of which full analyses can be found in the Supplementary Material). 
 
Personality Measures 
Prior to the experiment, participants were asked to fill out an electronic questionnaire comprising four 
self-report measures:  
Pre: Responses to facial 
displays of emotion 
Pre-Test: 
Behavioural Measures of 
Affective Empathy 
Post-Test: 
Behavioural Measures of 
Affective Empathy 
Moral decision-making 
measures 
Moral actions and heart rate 
in virtual moral dilemma  
Moral judgments and heart 
rate in text-based moral 
dilemma  
Post: Responses to facial 
displays of emotion 
Pre: Responses to painful or 
neutral images 
Post: Responses to painful or 
neutral images 
Alcohol 
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The Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP) (Levenson, Kiehl, & Fitzpatrick, 1995) is a self-
report measure of psychopathy intended for research purposes. It has a two-factor structure assessing both 
primary psychopathic traits (16 items, e.g., selfishness) and secondary psychopathic traits (10 items, e.g., 
impulsivity) in non-institutionalised populations (αs = .72 - .84). The scale contains 26 items total, rated on a 4-
point Likert scale (from 1 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree). The scale includes items such as “For me, 
what’s right is whatever I can get away with”.   
The Hexaco-60 (Ashton & Lee, 2009) is a personality inventory designed to assess six dimensions of 
personality. The inventory assesses the characteristics of Honesty-Humility (Items 10), Emotionality (Items 10), 
Extraversion (Items 10), Agreeableness (Items 10), Conscientiousness (Items 10) and Openness to experience 
(Items 10) (αs = .79 - .82). 3  The inventory contains 60 items with responses given on a 5-point Likert scale 
(from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree).  The inventory contains items such as “I wouldn’t pretend to 
like someone just to get that person to do favours for me”.  
 The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis, 1983) is an inventory designed to measure 
dispositional empathy. It contains four subscales to measure Perspective Taking, Empathic Concern, Personal 
Distress, and Fantasy (αs = .72 - .84). Perspective Taking is thought to relate to cognitive empathy while 
Empathic Concern is thought to relate to affective empathy. Personal Distress is often seen as a distinct 
conceptualisation to empathy (e.g., Batson, 2009; Decety & Moriguchi, 2007) and is included as a measure of 
“...self-oriented, egoistic” reactions (Decety & Moriguchi, 2007, p.17). The inventory contains 28 items with 
responses given on a 5-point Likert scale (from A = Does not describe me well to E = Describes me very well). 
The scale contains items such as “I really get involved with the feelings of characters in a novel”. 
The Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) provides a measure of moral 
identity. It contains two subscales that assess symbolization (i.e., public dimension of moral identity) (5 items; α 
= .69) and internalization (i.e., private dimension of moral identity) (5 items; α = .87). The inventory contains 10 
items with responses given on a 5-point Likert scale (from A = Does not describe me well to E = Describes me 
very well). The scale contains items such as “It would make me feel good to be a person who has these 
characteristics”.  
Behavioural Measures of Affective Empathy 
In the present experiment, additional behavioural measures of affective empathy were included. These 
were completed by all participants pre- and post-intervention in a counterbalanced order: 
Facial task. In an attempt to assess affective empathy, the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) (Bradley & 
Lang, 1994) assesses an individual’s response to emotional stimuli rather than relying on self-report 
questionnaires. Adopting a procedure similar to that used in previous research (Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012), 
images depicting specific facial expressions (happy, sad, and neutral) were presented to participants (see Figure 
II). These images were sampled from the Montreal Set of Facial Displays of Emotion (MSFDE) (Beaupré, 
Cheung, & Hess, 2000) and comprised eight images per emotion, gender-balanced and comprising only 
Caucasian faces. All images were presented in the same size and in greyscale. Following presentation, 
participants were asked to indicate how they felt towards the face on the SAM valence scale (1 (negative) – 9 
(positive)). In the pre-intervention task, four images of each emotion were presented to participants with the 
remaining 50% of images presented during the post-intervention task to prevent carryover effects.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 The HEXACO scale was minimised to the Honesty-Humility (α = .79) and Agreeableness (α = .82) facets. 
Agreeableness was also included in the present investigation given its inverse association with anger and 
aggssion (Ashton & Lee, 2007); states also associated with alcohol consumption (Giancola, 2004). 
(a) (b) (c) 
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Figure II.  Example of neutral (a), sad (b), and happy (c) expression stimuli (Beaupré et al., 2000) 
Pain task. The empathy for pain paradigm included in the present experiment has been adopted in 
previous research as a means of assessing affective responses when perceiving the pain of others (Jackson et al., 
2005) and has been argued to be a way in which to address the processes involved in empathy (Decety & 
Jackson, 2004). Adopting procedures from previous research (e.g., Jackson et al., 2005), images of hands and 
feet in painful and neutral conditions were presented to individuals (see Figure III). Following this, participants 
were asked to indicate on a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) (0 (no pain) - 10 (worse pain ever)) the intensity of 
pain they thought the person in the image would feel in that situation. Our image group, sampled from an 
existing set (Jackson et al., 2005), comprised 18 painful images of familiar events and 18 neutral counterparts of 
the same events taken at “…angles that promoted first-person perspective” (Jackson et al., 2005, p. 772). The 
types of pain included in these images were mechanical, thermal, and pressure-related with individuals in the 
images varying in both gender and age. All images were displayed in the same size. In the pre-intervention task, 
nine of the neutral and nine of the painful images were presented to participants with the remaining images 
presented during the post-intervention task to prevent carryover effects.  
The presentation of facial displays of emotion and pain image blocks were counterbalanced across 
participants in both the pre-intervention and post-intervention completion of the tasks. No image was displayed 
more than once throughout the whole experiment.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure III.  Example of painful stimuli (a) and non-painful stimuli (b) (Jackson et al., 2005) 
 
Moral Decision-Making Measures  
All participants completed a non-moral and moral action task and a non-moral and moral judgment 
task, both taken from Francis et al. (2016). For the action tasks, participants were presented with virtual reality 
scenarios using a head-mounted display (Oculus Rift 2). In the non-moral and moral virtual tasks, participants 
were given verbal instructions informing them that they would have the opportunity to engage with a virtual 
object using a joystick. Participants first completed the non-moral virtual task which involved pushing a virtual 
object (3D shape) upon hearing a tone. This task allowed a baseline measure of heart rate change to be collected 
(see physiological measures). It also allowed us to determine if changes in arousal in the subsequent virtual 
moral task were attributable to modality or moral content (Francis et al., 2016). For the moral action task, 
participants were presented with an audio-visual virtual reconstruction of the footbridge dilemma. The dilemma 
played out in real-time as described in Foot (1978) with the participant standing on a footbridge behind a large 
person. The scene was displayed in first person view. In the scenario, a modern train railcar approached from 
behind the participant, towards five virtual human agents standing on the tracks in front of the participant. 
Participants would have to decide whether to push the large person off the footbridge to stop the railcar’s 
progress or to allow the railcar to continue and kill the people standing on the track ahead. The following audio 
(a
) 
(b
) 
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descriptions were played to participants within the virtual environment: 
1. 30s: “Look behind you, a train is coming”. 
2. 55s: “Hey I am too far away but if you want to save the people you could push the large person on to the 
tracks and derail the train. If you’re going to push them, do it now, but it is your choice”.   
As in previous studies (see Francis et al., 2016; Francis, Gummerum, et al., 2017), participants were given ten 
seconds to respond in the dilemma (by choosing to push with the joystick or by choosing to do nothing). 
For the judgment task, participants were given a non-moral sample vignettes to read which contained 
instructions displayed in the format of the pending dilemmas. Given that participants were completing both the 
moral action and moral judgment task, a validated 4 and comparable moral dilemma to the footbridge dilemma 
was used in moral judgment task (see Francis, Gummerum, et al., 2017). This comparable moral dilemma was 
matched to the footbridge across the moral principles of benefit-recipient, inevitability, moral magnitude, 
physical contact, and personal force.  This dilemma was embedded in nine distracter dilemmas; five were 
classified as personal and four as impersonal and were selected from those originally used in Greene et al., 
(2001). All dilemmas were presented electronically in a random order. As in previous studies (Francis et al., 
2016; Francis, Terbeck, et al., 2017; Francis, Gummerum, et al., 2017), after each dilemma, participants were 
asked a morality question (“Is it morally acceptable to [specific to the scenario]?”). After a response was given, 
a second behavioural question was displayed asking (“Would you do it?”).5 Participants responded by selecting 
“Yes” (Y- key) or “No” (N - key) and these were then coded as utilitarian (yes) or non-utilitarian (no).  
Physiological Measures  
Alcohol. In order to assess and monitor the effects of alcohol in the low and high alcohol conditions, 
estimated blood alcohol levels (% BAC) were taken at specific intervals during the experiment from each 
participant’s breath air, using a portable breathalyser device (AlcoSense Pro Breathalyser and Alcohol Tester) 
utilised by UK police forces. The breathalyser measures the concentration of alcohol vapour in a single breath.  
Moral decision-making tasks. Heart rate was recorded using the equipment and procedure adopted in 
Francis et al., (2016). A Cateye-PL-6000 heart rate monitor was attached to participants via an ear clip. As 
outlined in previous research, heart rate change (bpm) can be both abrupt and gradual (Francis et al., 2016) and 
so heart rate readings were taken at the onset and offset of all non-moral and moral tasks. The duration between 
onset and offset of tasks was dependent on the task type (non-moral; moral) and was determined by reading 
speed in the judgment tasks (see Francis et al., 2016 for a full description of this sampling procedure). Heart rate 
sampling was completed with the primary aims of assessing whether arousal was modality or moral specific. 6          
Procedure  
Pre-intervention. Prior to arriving at the experiment, participants were reminded to refrain from 
drinking alcoholic beverages within 12 hours of the experiment beginning. All conditions first completed the 
personality trait assessments, a pre-questionnaire assessing their previous game-related (weekly hours of video 
game playing and number of times playing games annually) and a subjective mood visual analogue scale 
(100mm long) assessing disinhibition and positive affect (Duke & Begue, 2015). Participants then completed 
the behavioural measures of affective empathy. Participants were seated 50cm away from a PC. At the 
beginning of the task, a resting slide appeared on-screen and participants were instructed to look at the fixation 
cross at the centre of the screen. Sixty seconds from the onset of the resting slide, the first stimulus appeared. 
                                                          
4 See Francis, Gummerum, et al., (2017) supporting information for validation studies; two experiments with 
qualitatively different populations found no differences in responses to the footbridge dilemma and the matched 
dilemma. 
5 While previous research has examined action-choice questions (behavioural question) as distinct from 
judgment questions (morality question), both of these remain self-reported moral judgments with a behavioural 
question only being “…what the participants think their action could be if they were to make the decision in real 
life” (Tassy, Oullier, et al., 2013, p. 2). Whereas, virtual reality offers the opportunity to present dynamic 
environments in which researchers can investigate theoretical and normative decisions in the framework of 
moral action (Navarrete et al., 2012) in which we can ask whether someone would “…actually resort to this 
course of action when the full repertoire of contextual features comes into play?” (Patil et al., 2014, p. 95).  
6 Although previous research has investigated arousal as a predictor of moral decisions in virtual dilemmas 
(Navarrete et al., 2012; Patil et al., 2016), in the present paradigm, heart rate change also incorporates the time 
in which participants witness the consequences of their actions. Given that we measure arousal beyond decision-
making, we do not investigate predictions of moral actions from heart rate change in the present experiment 
(Francis et al., 2016).  
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Following an existing procedure (Partala & Surakka, 2003), each image stimulus was presented for six seconds. 
After image offset, the relevant scale was presented for eight seconds to be completed by participants (SAM 
valence scale for facial displays of emotion or VAS for pain images). Participants used the computer mouse 
with their right hand to select a rating along the given scale. Following scale offset, a blank slide with a fixation 
cross would be displayed for a randomised interval of 10-15s before the next image stimulus was delivered to 
prevent anticipation of stimuli (see Figure IV). Following completion of the pre-intervention behavioural 
measures of affective empathy, participants were given an additional questionnaire to complete which assessed 
their alcohol consumption (units per week) and their current weight (kg).7 Participants were then randomly 
allocated to one of the three conditions: placebo, low alcohol, or high alcohol. An estimate baseline BAC was 
then taken (participants were asked to blow into a sterile tube attached to the portable breathalysing device).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure IV. Diagram of experimental procedure in behavioural measures of affective empathy (facial and pain 
tasks). The same procedure was adopted in both the pre-intervention and post-intervention behavioural measures 
of affective empathy.    
 
Intervention. In an attempt to reach target BAC levels predefined in existing research and 
subsequently shown to affect moral decision-making: 0.038 - 0.04% (Duke & Begue, 2015), the high alcohol 
condition received 0.80g/kg vodka (37.5% alcohol by volume). The low alcohol condition received a dose of 
0.40g/kg vodka (37.5% alcohol by volume) to produce lower BAC levels, allowing a systematic investigation of 
the effect (if present) across a range of BAC levels. All alcoholic drinks were mixed with two-parts lemonade 
and were flavoured with fresh lime juice. Participants in the placebo condition were given lemonade flavoured 
with lime and alcohol was sprayed around the edge of the glass in order to provide an alcohol odour, ensuring 
that condition assignment was unknown. Alcohol expectancy has been shown to influence social behaviours 
(e.g., Assefi & Garry, 2003) by providing an excuse for individuals to engage in inhibited social behaviours and 
the ability to justify these behaviours. Given these expectancy effects, additional alcohol cues such as floating a 
small amount of alcohol on top of each placebo glass (e.g., Roberts, Fillmore, & Milich, 2012), were not 
adopted here to avoid participant expectation confounding task performance. The aim of this manipulation was 
to ensure that condition assignment was unknown and not to deceive placebo participants into accepting that 
they had consumed alcohol. In all conditions, participants were given ten minutes to consume the beverage. In 
                                                          
7 This questionnaire also assessed exclusion criteria for the present experiment including alcohol naivety, 
alcohol dependence (including that of family members) and current medication use. These criteria had been 
outlined to participants prior to signing up to the experiment but were also included during the experiment as a 
precautionary measure.  
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order to control for awareness of condition assignment, an awareness check was performed asking participants 
whether they knew which condition they had been assignment to and if so, how they knew. A waiting period of 
20 minutes followed in order for alcohol to be absorbed into the blood and to reach a predefined optimal level.8 
Following this, a second BAC reading was taken (estimated peak BAC). 
Post-intervention. All participants completed a second subjective mood assessment of disinhibition 
and positive affect, followed by the moral action and judgment tasks. The order of the moral tasks was 
counterbalanced. Participants then completed the post-intervention behavioural measures of affective empathy 
using a procedure identical to that of the pre-intervention behavioural measures of affective empathy. Following 
completion of this task, a final estimate BAC reading was taken. Participants were invited to leave the 
experiment after their BAC level had returned to a predetermined limit (< 0.01%).  
 
Statistical Analysis 
Given the mixed model experimental design adopted here, primary outcome measures were analysed as 
follows:  
Moral Responses and Alcohol 
In order to compare moral judgments and moral actions, simulated moral actions in the virtual version 
of the footbridge dilemma were compared to the moral judgments made in response to the text-based 
counterpart. Given that responses to the moral judgment task and moral action task were binary (yes/utilitarian; 
no/non-utilitarian), Generalised Estimating Equations (GEE) were performed using a binary logistic model with 
task (judgment task; action task) as within-subjects factor and condition (placebo; low alcohol; high alcohol) as 
between-subjects factor. Two analyses were carried out, the first using the morality question in the judgment 
task and the second using the behavioural question in the judgment task. This analysis was designed to compare 
moral actions in virtual reality and moral judgments in text-based vignettes, hence the morality and behavioural 
questions were referenced in separate analyses (as both are self-reported judgement deriving from the same text-
based moral dilemma). Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) is an extension of Generalized Linear Models 
(GZLM). Like GZLM, it allows analysis of scale, count, or binary responses (residuals can follow a non-normal 
distribution) but also allows analysis of repeated measures variables (or more broadly, correlated observations) 
which GZLM does not. Given that GEE enables analysis of binary responses and repeated measures variables, it 
is used here to analyse binary moral responses (utilitarian; non-utilitarian) across the repeated-measures moral 
decision-making tasks (virtual moral dilemma; text-based moral dilemma) in the three alcohol groups (placebo; 
low alcohol; high alcohol). This analysis has been used in previous research comparing moral action and 
judgment in the same individuals (Francis, Gummerum et al., 2017). Given that these analyses are dealing with 
binary data, Cohen’s h is included as a measure of effect size as it concerns the difference between two 
proportions and the same rules of thumb for interpreting the size of Cohen’s d apply to Cohen’s h.  
Heart Rate and Alcohol  
In all groups, changes in heart rate were calculated by subtracting the heart rate readings (bpm) taken at 
the offset of the moral (and non-moral) tasks from those taken at the onset of the moral (and non-moral task) 
tasks. Heart rate changes were analysed using a mixed model ANOVA although the ratio of greatest and least 
variance in heart rate change was >3 and as such, this analysis was repeated, and findings replicated using 
Generalised Estimating Equations, which does not assume homogeneity of variance (see Supplementary 
Material).   
Note that additional analyses were performed for these primary outcome measures to examine the 
relationship between individual differences in alcohol absorption and moral responses and individual differences 
in alcohol absorption and heart rate changes. 
Alcohol and Behavioural Measures of Affective Empathy     
                                                          
8 Peak BAC was estimated using previous research (Mitchell, Teigen, & Ramchandani, 2014) and initial pilot 
testing; participants (N = 7, Mage = 27.72, 3 females, 4 males) who consumed alcohol at low and high dosage 
reached peak BAC between approximately 20 – 40 minutes. All participants receiving the low or high alcohol 
dosages reached the target BAC levels in this time frame (low: 0.01%, high: 0.04%). 
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 Facial task.  The SAM was used to assess self-reported valence to facial emotions and subsequent 
affective empathy (Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012). Valence scores were calculated by averaging self-reported 
valence scores (1 (negative) – 9 (positive)) across each emotion set of facial expressions (neutral; happy; sad) 
for the pre-intervention and post-intervention tests (see Supplementary Material for descriptive statistics).  
Pain task.  The pain task was used to assess affective empathy for pain (Jackson et al., 2005). Empathy 
for pain scores were calculated by averaging the responses given on the VAS (0 (no pain) – 10 (worse pain 
ever)) for neutral and painful images for the pre-intervention and post-intervention tests (see Supplementary 
Material for descriptive statistics).  
In order to examine the effects of the alcohol intervention on these behavioural measures of affective 
empathy, separate three-way mixed ANOVAs were performed for the facial task and pain task. If behavioural 
measures of affective empathy (valence towards faces or pain responses) were affected by alcohol consumption, 
secondary analyses were performed to determine whether these changes affected moral decision-making. For 
the facial task, changes in valence were calculated by taking the difference between mean valence scores for 
each facial expression between the pre- and post-intervention tests. Prior to calculating change scores and to 
account for baseline differences, a one-way ANOVA found no differences between valence scores for each 
facial expression between conditions in the pre-intervention test (ps >.289). For the pain task, changes in mean 
empathy for pain scores were calculated in the same way by taking the difference between VAS scores for both 
image types (neutral; painful) between the pre- and post-intervention. There were no differences between VAS 
scores for both image types between conditions in the pre-intervention test (ps >.642).The relationship between 
these changes scores and moral actions and moral judgments were subsequently analysed using point-biserial 
correlations. In a final analysis of these behavioural measures of affective empathy and in order to determine if 
these behavioural assessments of affective empathy were related to self-report measures of affective empathy, 
psychopathy, and associated traits, bivariate correlations were performed between traits and self-reported 
valence to facial emotions collected in the pre-intervention test and between traits and self-reported responses to 
neutral and painful images collected in the pre-intervention test, prior to the alcohol intervention. This was done 
to validate the behavioural measures of affective empathy included here as in previous research (Wai & 
Tiliopoulos, 2012). The post-intervention behavioural measures of affective empathy were not included in this 
analysis given the potential mediating effects of alcohol consumption on on-line performances in these tasks. 
Results 
Control Variables and Checks 
BAC levels were significantly different between all conditions, (F(2, 45) = 51.97, p < .001, ηp² = .70), 
with average peak BAC levels (%) highest in the high alcohol condition (M = 0.03%, SD = 0.01, Range = 0.01% 
- 0.05%), moderate in the low alcohol condition (M = 0.01%, SD = 0.01, Range = 0% - 0.03%), and as expected, 
absent in the placebo condition. Reported awareness of condition assignment was not associated with either 
moral actions or moral judgments (ps > .388). Across conditions, there were no differences in self-reported 
drinking habits (p = .328) and drinking habits did not correlate with peak BAC level (p = .975). With previous 
research suggesting that the relationship between alcohol and moral decision-making may be influenced by 
feelings of disinhibition or positive affect (Duke & Begue, 2015), subjective mood ratings (disinhibition; 
positive affect) were compared before and after the alcohol intervention. Analysis revealed that self-reported 
disinhibition was not different between conditions (p = .740) or following the intervention (p = .938). Positive 
affect was significantly lower after the intervention, (F(1, 45) = 9.18, p = .004, d = 0.32) but was not associated 
with either moral actions (p = .673) or moral judgments (ps > .175). Following these checks, awareness checks, 
drinking habits and subjective mood were not included in further analyses (for full details regarding analyses of 
control variables and checks, see Supplementary Material). 
Moral Responses 
Across alcohol and placebo conditions, the proportion of utilitarian responses was higher when 
simulated action was required in virtual reality compared to when judgment was required in the text-based 
counterpart (see Table I).  
 
Table I 
Percentage of Utilitarian Responses in Moral Judgment and Action Tasks  
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 Moral judgment task Moral action task 
Condition Morality question Behavioural question  
Placebo 25% 25% 75% 
Low Alcohol 18.75% 6.25% 68.75% 
High Alcohol 6.25% 6.25% 68.75% 
 
GEE analyses were performed using a binary logistic model with task (judgment task; action task) as 
within-subjects factor and condition (placebo; low alcohol; high alcohol) as between-subjects factor (see Figure 
V).  When referencing the morality question, analysis revealed a main effect of task, (Wald X2[1] = 27.18, p 
< .001, h = -1.15), with a greater proportion of utilitarian responses overall in action tasks compared to judgment 
tasks. There was no main effect of condition (p = .470) and no interaction (p = .566). When referencing the 
behavioural question, analysis revealed a main effect of task, (Wald X2[1] = 24.90, p < .001, h = -1.27), with a 
greater proportion of utilitarian responses overall in action tasks compared to judgment tasks. There was no 
main effect of condition (p = .286) and no interaction (p = .480). 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure V. Utilitarian responses (%) in the moral action task (virtual footbridge) and the moral judgment task 
(text-based footbridge counterpart) in the placebo, low alcohol and high alcohol conditions. In the judgment 
task, participants were asked whether the action was morally acceptable and whether they would do it. A greater 
number of utilitarian outcomes were endorsed in the moral action task.10 Error bars represent +- 1 SEp. 
                                                          
9 In order to determine if there were differences in responses to questions, an additional GEE analysis 
incorporating both the morality and behavioural questions, revealed a main effect of task (Wald X2[1] = 36.28, p 
< .001), with a greater proportion of utilitarian responses overall in the action task as compared to both 
questions in the judgment task (ps < .001) but no difference between moral responses to the morality question 
and behavioural question (p = 1.00). There was no main effect of condition (p = .229) and no interaction (p 
= .466). 
10 Although GEE analyses revealed no significant response differences between conditions, the differences 
between conditions in their responses to the judgment task appeared to be large (e.g., 6.25% versus 25% 
utilitarian responses). As such, we carried out additional separate chi-square tests comparing responses to the 
morality question and the behavioural question between conditions. These supported GEE analyses showing no 
significant differences between conditions in their moral judgments made in response to either the morality 
question (p = .492) or behavioural question (p = .333).     
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 Following statistical analyses adopted in previous research (Duke & Begue, 2015), analyses were also 
carried out using BAC level as a predictor of moral responses (non-utilitarian; utilitarian) in both the moral 
action task and moral judgment task. Peak BAC level was not a significant predictor of moral responses in the 
virtual moral action task (p = .575) or the moral judgment task when referencing both the morality and 
behavioural question (ps > .109).   
Heart rate responses. Mean heart rate change was highest for the moral action task (virtual footbridge 
dilemma) across conditions. Heart rate change decreased for the moral judgment task (text counterpart dilemma) 
and both the action and judgment non-moral tasks. 
A mixed ANOVA was conducted on heart rate changes with task (judgment task; action task) and type 
(non-moral task; moral task) as within-subjects factors and condition (placebo; low alcohol; high alcohol) as the 
between-subjects factor. Analysis revealed a main effect of task, (F(1, 45) = 23.12, p < .001), a main effect of 
type, (F(1, 45) = 20.70, p < .001) and a significant interaction of type x task, (F(1, 45) = 5.92, p = .019) (see 
Figure VI). There was no main effect of condition (p = .436) and no further interactions (ps > .320).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure VI. Mean heart rate change (bpm) for non-moral and moral task type in judgment and action tasks by 
condition. Increased heart rate changes were observed in the virtual moral action task across conditions. Error 
bars represent +- 1 SE. 
 
To further investigate the interaction of type x task, simple effects analyses were performed comparing 
heart rate changes in non-moral and moral tasks within both judgment and action tasks. A significant difference 
was found between non-moral and moral tasks in the judgment task across groups, (F(1, 45) = 8.11, p = .007, d 
= -0.63) and in the action task across groups, (F(1, 45) = 14.53, p < .001, d = -0.80) with greater heart rate 
changes observed in moral tasks. There was a significant difference in heart rate change between the judgment 
and action task but for the moral tasks only, (F(1, 45) = 17.21, p < .001, d = -0.76) with greater heart rate 
changes observed overall in the virtual moral action task. Heart rate change for the non-moral tasks was not 
significantly different between action and judgment tasks (p = .129). 
In further analyses accounting for variation in alcohol absorption, bivariate correlations were carried 
out to determine whether heart rate change in tasks was associated with peak BAC levels. BAC levels were not 
correlated with heart rate change in the moral judgment task (p = .789) or the judgment and action non-moral 
tasks (ps > .536). Peak BAC level had a moderate negative correlation with heart rate change in the moral action 
task, (r(46) = -.37, p = .009) (see Figure VII) and when entered into a univariate linear regression, was found to 
explain 13.8% of the variance in the model, (R2 = .138, F(1,46) = 7.36, p = .009) when predicting this heart rate 
change (β = -.37, p = .009).  
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Figure VII. Heart rate change (bpm) in the moral action task (virtual footbridge) plotted against peak BAC 
levels (%). Peak BAC was a negative predictor of heart rate change in the virtual moral action task. Linear 
regression trendline: R2 = .14.  
 
Behavioural Measures of Affective Empathy 
Valence and alcohol. A three-way mixed ANOVA was performed to determine the effects of condition 
(placebo; low alcohol; high alcohol), emotion (neutral; happy; sad), and test (pre-intervention; post-intervention) 
on self-reported valence to faces. Analysis revealed a main effect of emotion, (F(2, 90) = 141.04, p < .001), a 
significant two-way interaction of  test x emotion, (F(2, 90) = 5.95, p = .004), and a statistically significant 
three-way interaction between condition x test x emotion, (F(4, 90) = 6.03, p < .001). There was no main effect 
of test (p = .195) or condition (p = .990) and no further interactions (ps > .463). 
In order to examine the higher-order interaction further, simple effects tests follow. Statistical 
significance of simple two-way interactions and follow-up simple main effects were accepted at a Bonferroni-
adjusted level (p = .017). Analysis revealed a statistically significant two-way interaction of test x emotion in 
the high alcohol condition, (F(2, 30) = 21.21 , p < .001) (see Figure VIII (c)) but not in the placebo (p = .665) 
(see Figure VIII (a)) or low alcohol conditions (p = .933) (see Figure VIII (b)). In order to investigate this 
interaction further, the effect of test (pre-intervention; post-intervention) was examined for each emotion 
(neutral; happy; sad) using simple effects tests. There was a statistically significant simple main effect of test for 
the high alcohol condition in reported valence to happy faces and sad faces but not in valence towards neutral 
faces (p = .309). For participants in the high alcohol condition, valence towards happy faces was significantly 
lower (more negative) in the post-test after alcohol consumption, (t(15) = 5.18, p < .001, d = 1.29) and valence 
towards sad faces was significantly higher (more positive) in the post-test after alcohol consumption, (t(15) = -
3.46, p = .003, d = -0.87) (see Figure VIII (c)). 
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Figure VIII. Simple interaction effects showing average self-reported valence to facial expressions (1 (negative) 
– 9 (positive)) in the (i) placebo condition, (ii) low alcohol condition, and (iii) high alcohol condition. A 
significant interaction effect was found for the high alcohol condition and for happy and sad facial expressions 
only. This interaction can be seen in the different slopes of the pre-intervention (dotted line) and post-
intervention (solid line) valence in the (iii) high alcohol condition. Error bars represent +- 1 SE.   
 
Empathy for pain and alcohol. A three-way mixed ANOVA was performed to determine the effects of 
condition (placebo; low alcohol; high alcohol), image type (neutral; painful), and test (pre-intervention; post-
intervention) on VAS scores assessing empathy for pain. Analysis revealed a significant main effect of image 
type, (F(1, 45) = 1221.51, p < .001), and a significant two-way interaction of test x image type, (F(1, 45) = 9.23, 
p = .004). There was no main effect of test (p = .056), no main effect of condition (p = .835) and no further 
interactions (ps > .500).  
To further investigate the interaction between test x image type, simple effects analyses were 
performed comparing empathy for pain scores for neutral and painful images within both the pre-intervention 
and post-intervention tests. A significant difference was found between pain scores for neutral and painful 
images in both the pre-test (F(1, 45) = 1031.75, p < .001, d = -5.35) and post-test (F(1, 45) = 943.13, p < .001, d 
= -5.38) with painful images eliciting higher VAS scores overall. In the post-test, empathy for pain scores in 
response to neutral images, were significantly lower compared to the pre-test, (F(1, 45) = 14.52, p < .001, d = 
0.51) (see Figure IX). 
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Figure IX. Bar graphs showing average empathy for pain scores on the VAS (0 (no pain) – 10 (worse pain ever) 
in response to (i) neutral images and (ii) painful images. A significant interaction effect revealed higher VAS 
scores for painful images across pre- and post-intervention tests and significantly lower VAS scores for neutral 
images in the post-test. This interaction can be seen in the different slopes of the VAS scores for painful images 
versus neutral images and in the different slopes of the pre-intervention (dotted line) and post-intervention (solid 
line) VAS scores in the (i) neutral images. Error bars represent +- 1 SE.   
Affective empathy and moral responses. Following the finding that valence towards sad and happy 
faces was affected by alcohol consumption, a point-biserial correlational analysis was performed revealing that 
changes in self-reported valence towards happy and sad faces between the pre- and post-intervention tests, were 
not associated with moral actions (ps > .651) or moral judgments (ps > .372). Given the test x emotion x 
condition interaction, partial correlations controlling for BAC levels were also performed revealing no 
relationship between changes in self-reported valence towards happy and sad faces and moral responses 
(ps > .132). 
Changes in empathy for pain scores between the pre- and post-interventions for neutral and painful 
images were not associated with either moral actions (ps > .114) or moral judgments (ps > .344). 
Affective empathy and traits. Moderate correlations showed that individuals scoring higher in primary 
psychopathy felt more positively when looking at sad facial expressions, (r(46) = .39, p =.007) and more 
negatively when looking at happy facial expressions, (r(46) = -.34, p =.017). Honesty-Humility, on the other 
hand, correlated negatively with valence towards sad facial expressions, (r(46) = -.47, p =.001) and positively 
with valence towards happy facial expressions, (r(46) = .35, p =.015). Additionally, individuals scoring higher 
in Internalization, felt more positively towards happy facial expressions, (r(46) = .29, p =.048) and individuals 
with higher Empathic Concern scores, reported feeling more negative towards sad facial expressions, (r(46) = 
-.30, p =.037) (see Supplementary Material for table of trait correlations).   
Moderate correlations revealed that individuals scoring higher in primary psychopathy had lower 
empathy for pain scores when looking at painful images, (r(46) = -.35, p =.016). Empathic Concern, on the other 
hand, correlated positively with empathy for pain scores on the VAS in response to painful images, (r(46) = .31, 
p =.03). Individuals scoring higher in Honesty-Humility reported greater empathy for pain scores when looking 
at neutral images, (r(46) = .32, p =.025) (see Supplementary Material for table of trait correlations).  
  
General Discussion 
Overall, greater utilitarian endorsements were observed when simulated action was required in virtual 
reality, compared to when moral judgments were required in a text-based counterpart dilemma. Whilst alcohol 
consumption altered self-reported performances in behavioural measures of affective empathy and heart-rate 
responses in the virtual moral dilemma, in the present study, alcohol intake did not affect moral actions or moral 
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judgments. These results contrast with previous findings investigating acute alcohol effects on moral decision-
making.  
Moral Actions versus Judgments 
Participants in the present experiment demonstrated moral inconsistency; greater utilitarian actions 
were observed in the virtual footbridge dilemma, with fewer utilitarian judgments observed in the text-based 
counterpart, regardless of condition assignment. These results corroborate existing virtual research that 
demonstrates disparity between saying and doing (e.g., Francis et al., 2016; Francis, Terbeck, et al., 2017; 
Francis, Gummerum, et al., 2017; McDonald et al., 2018; Patil et al., 2014). In previous virtual research, the 
preference for simulating characteristically utilitarian actions in virtual reality has been interpreted through two 
accounts. Frame of reference accounts theorise that egocentric perspectives and subsequent self-interested 
motives drive moral actions as individuals consider the self-relevant consequences of their own actions (Francis, 
Terbeck, et al., 2017; Tassy, Deruelle et al., 2013; Tassy, Oullier, Mancini, & Wicker, 2013). Judgments, on the 
other hand, are theorised to rely on allocentric evaluations and subsequently, cultural norms (Tassy, Deruelle et 
al., 2013; Tassy, Oullier et al., 2013). Contextual saliency accounts argue that the physical features in virtual 
scenarios allow individuals to “see” potential victims in a moral dilemma, and this then results in greater 
negative emphasis being placed on witnessing victims die than on performing harmful actions (Francis et al., 
2016; Francis, Terbeck, et al., 2017; Patil et al., 2014). 
With regards to the alcohol intervention in the present experiment, we had hypothesised alternative 
outcomes based on divergent streams of research seeking to understand the roles of deliberation versus social 
processing in moral decision-making (e.g., Duke & Begue, 2015; Greene et al., 2001; Patil, 2015). Based on a 
deliberation-focused hypothesis, with alcohol increasing emotional reactivity and decreasing cognitive 
functioning, non-utilitarian preferences would be predicted (Greene et al., 2001). Alternatively, previous 
research has argued that alcohol intake results in deficits in social processing but more specifically, reduced 
aversion to harm, subsequently resulting in an increase in utilitarian moral judgments (Duke & Begue, 2015). 
In terms of moral actions, we outlined similar divergent hypotheses. If dual-process theories of moral 
judgment (Greene et al., 2001) transfer to the domain of moral action (Navarrete et al., 2012), the deliberation 
hypothesis might also transfer to moral actions, resulting in fewer utilitarian endorsements. However, given 
evidence that moral action and judgment are partially distinct (e.g., Tassy, Oullier, et al., 2013) and that moral 
inconsistency is often present in populations with social deficits (e.g., Cima, Tonnaer, & Hauser, 2010; Patil, 
2015), there could be a preference for greater utilitarian actions after alcohol consumption following the social 
processing hypothesis. However, in the present experiment, neither moral judgments nor moral actions were 
affected by alcohol consumption. As such, these results cannot provide support for either   the social processing 
hypothesis (Duke & Begue, 2015)  or the deliberation-based hypothesis (Greene et al., 2001).  
Alcohol and Arousal 
Supporting previous findings, heart rate changes were highest for virtual reality moral tasks across 
conditions (e.g., Francis et al., 2016). When taking BAC levels into account, increased BAC levels were 
associated with reduced arousal responses in the virtual reality moral task only. This supports the theory that 
virtual reality paradigms can prompt realistic physiological responses (e.g., Parsons, 2015) and the theory that 
alcohol may trigger affective processing deficits in emotionally aversive situations (Duke & Begue, 2015).    
Empathy and Psychopathy 
Behavioural affective empathy tasks prior to the alcohol intervention were validated against existing 
personality trait assessments. Replicating previous research (Ali et al., 2009; Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012), primary 
psychopathy was negatively associated with self-reported valence towards positive faces and positively related 
to self-reported valence towards negative faces. Wai and Tiliopoulos (2012) argue that the presentation of facial 
displays of emotion using the SAM (Bradley & Lang, 1994), may provide a more accurate measure of affective 
empathy than trait questionnaires. They argue that picturing another’s emotions generates an emotional 
contagion. Subsequently, the way in which an individual then feels (negatively or positively) about this display 
of emotion, is an empathic measure derived from the appropriateness of that reaction (Wai & Tiliopoulos, 
2012). The finding that individuals scoring high in primary psychopathy demonstrate “…inappropriate 
responding” to sad and happy faces (Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012, p. 797), reflects a deficit in this empathic 
contagion. The present experiment also extends these findings, having observed the opposite trend in individuals 
scoring high in traits negatively correlated with the Dark Triad, including Honesty-Humility, Empathic Concern, 
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and Internalization. In these cases, emotional responses to facial displays of emotion were appropriately aligned, 
with happy faces motivating self-reported positive valence and sad faces motivating negative valence.  
We had also hypothesised that primary psychopathy would negatively correlate with empathy for pain 
scores. This was supported in the present findings; individuals scoring higher in trait primary psychopathy 
demonstrated less intensity when rating the pain of others. Extending from this, the inversely related trait, 
Empathic Concern, was positively correlated with empathy for pain. This aligns with previous research showing 
that individuals scoring higher in Empathic Concern demonstrate a high level of care and consideration for the 
welfare of others (e.g., Davis, 1983). Unexpectedly, Honesty-Humility positively correlated with empathy for 
pain scores in neutral images. There are a few explanations for this association. Firstly, follow-up analysis 
revealed that empathy for pain scores between neutral and painful images were positively correlated in the pre-
intervention task, (r(46) = .37, p = .009) and post-intervention task, (r(46) = .33, p = .022) suggesting that 
similar mechanisms drive ratings of pain or anticipated pain in neutral images. Secondly, higher Honesty-
Humility has been associated with lower health and safety related risk-taking (Weller & Tikir, 2011) which, in 
this instance, may have intensified the anticipation of harmful outcomes pictured in neutral images.   
Alcohol and Empathy 
Given that alcohol is thought to diminish aversion for harm and hinder social processing (e.g., 
Carmona-Perera et al., 2014; Duke & Begue, 2015), we hypothesised that alcohol consumption would impair 
performance in the SAM as a result of these social impairments. This was supported in the present experiment; 
individuals receiving a high dosage of alcohol reported feeling more positively towards sad faces and more 
negatively towards happy faces in the post-intervention facial SAM task. These inappropriate responses reflect 
those of individuals scoring high in primary psychopathy (Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2012) and support the theory that 
alcohol impairs components of affective empathy (Duke & Begue, 2015). These results are in line with the 
finding that affective empathy is principally impaired in alcohol-dependent individuals (Maurage et al., 2011; 
Marinkovic et al., 2009) and addicted patients (e.g., Ferrari et al., 2014). However, in terms of moral responses, 
differences in the pre- and post-intervention facial behavioural measures of affective empathy, did not relate to 
either moral actions or moral judgments when controlling for alcohol consumption. Despite supporting the 
association between alcohol and impairment of affective empathy (Duke & Begue, 2015), this impairment did 
not result in utilitarian decision-making, as the social processing hypothesis would predict.  
Further, given evidence that harm aversion plays a mediating role in personality traits associated with 
making supposedly utilitarian endorsements (Patil, 2015), evidence for the role of these traits in moral 
inconsistency (Cima et al., 2010), and the theory that alcohol reduces harm aversion (Duke & Begue, 2015), we 
had predicted that alcohol consumption would reduce affective empathy towards individuals in painful 
circumstances. However, alcohol dosage did not affect empathy for pain scores in the present experiment. This 
supports existing research findings that pain intensity ratings are not affected by acute alcohol consumption 
despite empathic neural activity for pain being reduced (Hu, Cui, Fan, Pei, & Wang, 2017). Empathy for pain 
scores for neutral images, were significantly lower following the intervention across all conditions regardless of 
alcohol intake but it is likely that this finding reflects a familiarity effect as individuals became aware of the 
distinction between painful and neutral images in the present investigation.  
Alcohol, Empathy, and Utilitarianism 
It is important to raise an alternative interpretation, based on the present experiment’s findings, to the 
proposed association between affective empathy and utilitarian moral decision-making. Previous research has 
identified evidence of a relationship between anti-social traits, and simulated moral actions (Francis et al., 2016) 
and the power of these simulated actions (Francis, Terbeck, et al., 2017). We expanded these investigations 
using behavioural assessments of affective empathy given evidence that the relationship between psychopathy 
and utilitarian decision-making derives from empathic deficits (e.g., Glenn, Iyer, Graham, Koleva, & Haidt, 
2009) and subsequent diminished aversion to performing harmful actions (e.g., Patil, 2015).  
However, in the present experiment, affective empathy was successfully manipulated in a facial 
responding task following alcohol consumption, but this did not affect moral decision-making. This may suggest 
that is not only the un-empathic facets of traits such as psychopathy that drive utilitarian moral decision-making 
but perhaps other facets. For example, psychopaths have been found to demonstrate low anxiety and 
fearlessness (e.g., Miller, Gaughan, & Pryor, 2008) which might instead explain their diminished aversion to 
harm and tendency to respond in a utilitarian manner. Indeed, Koenigs, Kruepke, Zeier, & Newman (2012) 
found that low-anxious psychopaths (with inhibitory deficits) endorsed a greater proportion of utilitarian moral 
judgments in personal moral dilemmas when compared to high-anxious psychopaths and this relationship has 
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also been evidenced in psychopharmacological investigations in which anti-anxiety drugs (Lorazepam) have 
reduced harm aversion and subsequently resulted in greater utilitarian endorsements (Perkins et al., 2013). The 
low anxious facets of primary psychopathy are theorised to reflect emotional and inhibitory deficits (Koenigs et 
al., 2012), that compromise conditionability of moral norms (Blair, 1995) and subsequently reduce aversion to 
harm. For example, when facing a punishment following a transgression, we feel anxious, and this subsequently 
conditions us to avoid future transgressions. A diminished anxiety response is thought to compromise this 
conditioned response (e.g., Blair, 1995). Again, evidence in this area has been mixed (e.g., Schmitt & Newman, 
1999; Visser, Ashton, & Pozzebon, 2012) with research also highlighting the moderating role of aggression, 
rather than trait anxiety, in this relationship (Choe & Min, 2011; Gao & Tang, 2013). In the present 
investigation, we did not include measures of anxiety or aggression and so this theory remains speculative. 
However, with research suggesting a critical role for these facets in action aversion deficits, future research 
should consider incorporating these assessments in both moral judgment and moral action paradigms.    
It should also be noted that the relationship between acute alcohol effects and utilitarian moral 
decision-making found in previous research (Duke & Begue, 2015) may also derive from social awareness or 
social influence. Duke and Begue (2015) collected moral judgments made in response to the footbridge dilemma 
in bars. These social settings may have influenced moral judgments in a number of ways. Firstly, the 
disinhibited atmosphere may have made the perception of hypothetical trolley problems less serious, with 
previous research suggesting that these scenarios can be perceived as humorous (e.g., Bauman, McGraw, 
Bartels, & Warren, 2014). Alternatively, social pressures may have resulted in individuals acting in a way that 
they felt was publicly acceptable under social expectation (e.g., Gold, Pulford, & Colman, 2015). As such, 
future research examining the acute effects of alcohol intake on moral decision-making might consider 
including control measures such as social desirability and self-awareness scales.       
Moral Inconsistency 
While the within-subjects design of the present experiment allowed a direct comparison between moral 
judgments and moral actions made by the same individual (Patil et al., 2014), it might be argued that the 
comparison of moral judgments and moral actions is limited, given that each paradigm incorporated a different 
hypothetical moral dilemma. We chose not to include the footbridge dilemma in both the virtual and text-based 
tasks to remove any potential carry-over effects (Bartels et al., 2015). Importantly, in previous validation studies 
(see Francis, Gummerum, et al., 2017), we did not find a significant difference between responses to the 
footbridge dilemma and the modified dilemma, suggesting that it could be utilised as a reliable comparable 
dilemma. Further, no order effects were found based on the presentation of moral judgment and action tasks, 
suggesting that utilising different dilemmas did prevent potential carry-over effects. 
Methodological Considerations 
It is also important to highlight limitations of the present methodology. Firstly, no measure of cognitive 
functioning or executive functioning was included in the present experiment, a criticism mirroring that of 
previous research (Duke & Begue, 2015). This is significant given the mediating effect of executive functioning 
in the relationship between alcohol and aggression (e.g., Giancola, 2000, 2004; Godlaski & Giancola, 2009) and 
alcohol-related aggression and affective empathy (Giancola, 2003). As such, it was difficult to determine the 
extent to which the present dosages of alcohol affected executive functioning and the subsequent effects of this 
on moral decision-making. Future research should consider exploring the acute effects of alcohol in both social 
processing and executive function-based tasks. 
Secondly, the order of tasks following the intervention may influence results. The moral judgment and 
moral actions tasks preceded the post-intervention affective empathy tasks. This decision was made to ensure 
that moral judgment and moral action tasks were completed during the window of peak BAC level. However, it 
might be that completing moral decision-making tasks first subsequently influenced the outcome in the empathy 
tasks. Consequently, future research should consider counterbalancing the order of these tasks to control for 
possible carry-over effects.  
Importantly, the design of the present experiment, in terms of sample size and alcohol dosing, was 
based on previous research (Duke & Begue, 2015). While the average peak BAC levels recorded here were 
similar to the average recorded by Duke and Begue (2015), the range of BAC levels were smaller in the present 
investigation as a result of incorporating controlled dosages. Future research might consider incorporating 
higher dosages of alcohol that would extend these findings to the upper limits of the BAC level ranges reported 
in Duke and Begue’s field studies (0.05 – 0.16%). It is also important to note that sample sizes in the present 
study were based on Duke and Begue’s field studies and given that this investigation extends these original field 
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studies by including additional measures in a mixed model experimental design, power may be affected. Future 
research should consider extending the present work to larger and more diverse sample populations. Further, 
given that previous research has reported mixed findings regarding gender differences in ethanol metabolic rates 
and subsequent blood alcohol levels (e.g., Frezza et al., 1990; Thomasson, 1995) and that there has been 
evidence supporting gender differences in subjective ratings of facial displays of emotion (e.g., Lang, 
Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993; Montagne, Kessels, Frigerio, de Haan, & Perrett, 2005) and neural 
mechanisms underlying the processing of the pain of others (e.g., Han, Fan, & Mao, 2008), future research 
should investigate the interaction effects of gender differences on acute alcohol effects on affective empathy and 
moral decision-making. Gender effects were not initially examined here as the gender composition of each 
group did not allow such a comparative analysis (however following suggestions from an anonymous reviewer, 
see Supplementary Material for post-hoc analyses controlling for gender).  
Following from these methodological considerations, it is also important to consider the roles of 
dispositional traits and behavioural states in the current discussion. Dispositional traits are thought to reflect 
core personality profiles (e.g., Haslam, Bastian, & Bissett, 2004), with moral traits playing an important role in 
shaping our personal identity (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). Arguably and following from this, it is unlikely 
that the small to moderate dosages of alcohol in the present experiment, would alter core moral principles 
shaped by social and moral norms, despite influencing behavioural and state-dependent measures of affective 
empathy and social processing (Duke & Begue, 2015). Investigations should advance beyond the manipulation 
of state-dependent empathic processing and investigate moral judgments and simulated moral actions in 
populations in which there are likely to be distinct dispositional trait profiles. Further, it is important to highlight 
a limitation of incorporating relative measures of moral judgment, which assert that utilitarian and non-
utilitarian (or deontological) motivations operate inversely (Patil, 2015). Process dissociation approaches have 
revealed that moral ideologies guide moral judgments independently (Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Conway, 
Goldstein-Greenwood, Polacek, & Greene, 2018) and as such, relative measures may fail to detect both 
utilitarian and deontological inclinations. Whether this process dissociation translates to moral actions, requires 
further investigation but future work should expand these investigations to examine whether alcohol 
consumption, and subsequent changes in social processing, results in varying levels of both utilitarian and 
deontological inclinations in moral decision-making. 
Conclusion 
Given the theory that increased utilitarian endorsements are driven by diminished affective empathy 
(e.g., Duke et al., 2015) and aversion to harm (e.g., Patil, 2015), we examined these components specifically in 
the present experiment, revealing a complex picture. Consuming alcohol at higher dosages did reduce affective 
empathy in a facial responding task, but this did not alter moral decision-making; moral actions continued to be 
dominated by utilitarian responses and moral judgments primarily comprised non-utilitarian responses. Given 
that the sample used in this investigation was predominately female and sampled from a student population, we 
do not attempt to make broad generalisations given sample representativeness. The outcomes of the present 
investigation might suggest that facets beyond or in addition to deficits in affective empathy, influence the 
relationship between alcohol consumption and utilitarian endorsements (Duke et al., 2015) and psychopathic 
traits and utilitarian endorsements (e.g., Francis et al., 2016; Francis, Terbeck, et al., 2017). Future research 
should consider expanding the present investigation in order to determine if these effects generalize more 
broadly.  
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